5GW Theory Timeline

Summary:

Through several stages, the blog author examines whether fifth generation warfare can be called "warfare."

Is blogging warfare?

The author mentions the DoD concept of information operations, answering affirmatively.

Is activism warfare?

The author alludes to the White House at "war" with liberal activism. Also, the author makes reference to "low intensity conflict." Again, the answer is affirmative.

Are domestic law enforcement operations warfare?

Drawing parallels between domestic law enforcement and foreign counter-insurgency, the author again answers affirmatively.

Summing up the blog post, the author confutes "conflict" with "war" further by considering how expanding populations, resource conflict, homicide, and even super-empowered individuals -- "from Al Gore to Vladimir Putin to Hugo Chavez to George Bush" to the individual on the ground -- may ultimately be responsible for the outcomes of many conflicts. However, quoting a blog comment left elsewhere by "Smitten Eagle", the blog author promises a follow-up post which would tie the Uncertainty Principle into the consideration (given the large scope of so many actors involved in conflict?)

Summary:

Dan tdaxp links to a comment under a blog post at Skilluminati Research in which the commenter ponders the way fifth generation warfare will be a blending of warfare with "everything else":

I agree 100% that 5GW is an event horizon for warfare theory—it’s where war merges with everything else, where things become so radically different that the old theory is more of a hinderance than a help. (Thirtyseven commenting at Skilluminati Research)

Seizing upon the idea that 5GW will be an "event horizon for warfare theory", Dan tdaxp agrees, "with one change: 5GW is the event horizon, beyond which the xGW framework breaks down as violence is dispersed and action indirect enough that the study of war becomes the study of politics."

A lively discussion ensues, during which William Lind's "generations of modern warfare" (GMW) -- an important precursor to study of 5GW -- is distinguished from "xGW", to which 5GW belongs. 0GW - 5GW are more properly seen to exist through the framework of xGW than through Lind's GMW.

Summary:

The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century

by USMC, Colonel Thomas X. Hammes

Ongoing events in Iraq show how difficult it is for the world's only remaining superpower to impose its will upon other peoples. From Vietnam, French and US, to Afghanistan, Russian and US, to Israel and the Palestinians, to Somalia and Kosovo, recent history is replete with powerful military forces being tied up by seemingly weaker opponents. This is Fourth Generation War (4GW), and Colonel Thomas Hammes, United States Marine Corps, tells you all about it.

Hammes includes an overview of warfare through the ages as well as recommendations for prescriptive actions in today's world. This is an insightful book analysing the strengths and weaknesses of coventional military power against an enemy with a superior political willpower and ability to fight over time using unconventional means.

The book, which primarily considers 4GW, mentions 5GW briefly in three places near the end:

1. First, by stating that innovative leadership training will be required "not just to deal with the seventy-year-old phenomenon of 4GW but also to deal with 5GW as it evolves." [pages 274-275, paperback edition.]
2. "Only a highly flexible organization can hope to succeed in 4GW and still be prepared to deal with emerging 5GW..." & "We can continue to man 3GW organizations using an 1890s personnel system....Or we can accept that 4GW has arrived and that 5GW is evolving and organize ourselves accordingly." [page 289, paperback edition.]
3. "Fourth-generation war has been around for more than seventy years; no doubt the fifth generation is evolving even as we attempt to deal with its predecessor. We may not recognize it as it evolves around us. Or we may look at several alternative futures and see each as fifth-generation war." The bio-attacks on Capitol Hill -- anthrax and ricin -- are considered a precursor of 5GW; Hammes emphasizes the superempowered destructive individual or small group as a viable, perhaps defining aspect of 5GW. He then reiterates his belief that the U.S. should reorganize its military and societal capability for dealing with 4GW forces and 5GW forces that may evolve -- but does not suggest that America should develop 5GW force structures itself. I.e., 4GW and 5GW will characterize the opponent, not the U.S. [pages 290-291, paperback edition; last two pages of the book.]

Summary:

An apparent press release from OSS.net, through PRNewswire, in Windows .doc format, detailing need for fifth-generation tactics to create "the necessary new national security paradigm," as described by Robert David Steele.

“5th Generation “holistic” warfare requires a coherent global security strategy that places its primary emphasis on nurturing legitimate governance everywhere. Only legitimate governments can be effective at internal security against the minority seeking to be terrorists

<snip>

“5th Generation warfare is total war through total engagement, and it demands that the first priority be on both homeland education and infrastructure, followed by very high investments in global peaceful preventive measures (what Joe Nye calls ‘soft power’), with narrowly focused military intervention being a last resort.....”

Summary:

Building off a thought published by John Robb on his personal weblog, that the destructive technologically superempowered fighter defines fifth-generation warfare, Shlok offers his reasons why this will be so while offering a glimpse at "6GW" and "7GW":

Technological Singularity Track -- 5GW marks where "the human body becomes the limitation"; 6GW will occur when humans have replaced their human body (except for brain?) with technology; and 7GW will occur "when brains are made obsolete by machines".

OODA Loop Track -- With consideration of Dan tdaxp's xGW & OODA mapping: "The human decision cycle becomes irrelevant." Presumably, this will apply to 7GW, previously described.

Summary:

The idea is that small states can protect themselves if they are willing to use economic systems disruption as a strategic weapon.

Said systems disruption, and the Global Guerrilla dynamic, are called fifth-generation warfare. Scenarios involving the Ukraine, Georgia, and Russia are considered:

The answer is similar to the approach used by Ukraine when faced with a similar level of economic pressure earlier this year. In that crisis, Russia tried to cut-off supplies of natural gas to the Ukraine while at the same time pumping natural gas through pipelines that ran through the country. Of course, the Ukrainians naturally siphoned off the gas they needed from Russia's european customers. These customers quickly forced Russia to resolve the crisis.

Such methods may work to influence the target down a pre-determined path (in this case, retreat?)

Summary:

A blog post considering how "micropowers" might utilize 5GW to conduct warfare in the future.

The post begins with a look at a discussion on the blogs Coming Anarchy and Global Guerrillas, concerning the issue of micropowers and how Georgia (the nation) might be able to thwart Russian influence.

John Robb suggests systempunkt attacks; system disruption could coerce Russia to back down: This approach would not be 5GW, but 4GW (even though John Robb has called it fifth-generation), for two reasons:

1. "Directly hiring terrorists / mercenaries to carry out the operation may be old school very shortly. It allows too much opportunity for tracing the activity back to the employer, threatens the very secrecy necessary for running a successful 5GW operation."
2. "Again, we have the standard GG and 4GW ‘negativity’ approach, of merely: disruption, chaos, confusion, destruction. 5GW may indeed use these things, but the ultimate goal is not so much systempunkt as the creation of new orders that will continue to operate long after the 5GW force has finished its operations."

The post continues with a consideration of how micropowers, which seem to be forming on the world stage, may be setting the stage for 5GW. First, they are too small to directly attack (by whatever means, kinetic or non-kinetic) much larger nations; retaliations would be swift and probably decisive. Second, the "power" in "micropowers" may translate to a great capacity for influence if not control on the world stage: thus, a 5GW paradigm which greatly differs from pre-5GW paradigms.

Summary:

An attack on John Robb's concept of Global Guerrillas, particularly Robb's linking of Global Guerrillas to 5GW theory.

Dan tdaxp resonds,

5GW is not open source. 5GW is closed source.

Primarily, secrecy -- which will be important for fifth generation operations -- means that, unlike the "open source warfare" suggested by Robb for Global Guerrillas, fifth-generation warfare will necessarily be closed source.

Summary:

According to the author of the blog post, the xGW framework needs to be approached scientifically:

We need to safeguard 5GW Theory against these twin evils of academic theosophy and marketing buzzwordspeak. This can be accomplished by defining “generation,” or even better its symbol “G,” as a scale. It seems to be that “G” measures the kinetic intensity of conflict, [with] every new G being approximately 20 times less intense than the one below it.

First introduction of that conceptual framework of "G", or that the relation of "G" to intensity of kinetics within any generation should be a guide when contemplating xGW theory.

Two alternative approaches are given at the introduction to the post: William Lind's "Hegelian-Marxist-Dialectic b.s." and another which co-opts the terminology of "5GW" for reasons which may be unrelated to the actual intent behind using the xGW model for understanding warfare.

Summary:

A consideration of the "next generation of analysts and collectors which must confront these challenges" arising with the advent of 5GW.

The view is circumspect as the author contemplates previous contemplation inspired by various others writing about fifth generation warfare:

Much of the body of this new theory of warfare relies not upon the things of technological innovation (although the toys are always easiest to point to when seeking out the novel), but rather the patterns of use and shifting of behaviors enabled by these introduced objects and capabilities. The skillsets required to piece together these behaviors and the exploitable weaknesses therein (particularly under the time and operational constraints found in the field), are often fundamentally different than those currently taught by the methodologists or the structured analysis proponents that currently dominate the community’s schoolhouses. We are seeking alternatives but thus far find few.